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Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms

Abstract : A monopolist data intermediary strategically collects and sells consumer information to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. He charges a price of information and chooses the optimal information partition that maximizes the willingness to pay for information of firms. Different selling mechanisms are compared: take it or leave it offers, sequential bargaining, and auctions. The intermediary always prefers to sell information through auctions, whereas consumer surplus is maximized with sequential bargaining and take it or leave it offers. We discuss regulatory tools to reconcile the interests of the data intermediary and of regulators over which selling mechanism to use.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02288708
Contributor : Antoine Dubus Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, September 21, 2021 - 10:11:29 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, October 19, 2021 - 11:16:46 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-02288708, version 4

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David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck. Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms. 2021. ⟨hal-02288708v4⟩

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