The Anticompetitive Effect of Minority Share Acquisitions: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs

Sven Heim; Kai Hüschelrath; Ulrich Laitenberger; Yossi Spiegel

Journal articles

The Anticompetitive Effect of Minority Share Acquisitions: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs

Sven Heim ^{1, 2} Kai Hüschelrath ^{3, 2} Ulrich Laitenberger ^{4, 5, 6, 7, 2} Yossi Spiegel ^{8, 9}

1 CERNA i3 - Centre d'économie industrielle i3

2 ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research

3 University of Applied Sciences Schmalkalden

4 IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

5 Télécom Paris

6 ECOGE - Economie Gestion

I3, une unité mixte de recherche CNRS (UMR 9217) - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation

7 SES - Département Sciences Economiques et Sociales

8 Tel Aviv University [Tel Aviv]

9 Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Document type :

Journal articles

Domain :

Humanities and Social Sciences / Economics and Finance

Complete list of metadatas

https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02918873
Contributor : Ulrich Laitenberger <>
Submitted on : Friday, August 21, 2020 - 10:56:47 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, September 24, 2020 - 4:58:02 PM

The Anticompetitive Effect of Minority Share Acquisitions: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs

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