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Side-channel information leakage of code-based masked implementations

Wei Cheng 1, 2, 3 Olivier Rioul 1, 2, 3 Yi Liu 1, 2, 3 Julien Béguinot 1, 2, 3 Sylvain Guilley 1, 4, 3, 5 
2 COMNUM - Communications Numériques
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
4 SSH - Secure and Safe Hardware
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
Abstract : Side-channel attacks (SCAs) are among the most powerful physical attacks against cryptographic implementations. To thwart SCAs, a well-established countermeasure is random masking. A recent code-based masking formalism unifies several known masking schemes and allows one to carry out an all-in-one leakage quantification. In this paper, we investigate how a code-based masked imple- mentation leaks in an information-theoretic setting, where the mutual information measures the impact of both number and positions of probes in the probing attack model. We also establish that the mutual information decreases as the measurement noise variance increases, with an exponent equal to the dual distance of the masking code. Our findings quantitatively connect the attacker’s capability to recover secret keys with the actual mutual information leakage of the protected implementation.
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https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-03718708
Contributor : Olivier Rioul Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Saturday, July 9, 2022 - 7:59:57 AM
Last modification on : Saturday, August 13, 2022 - 3:10:05 AM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03718708, version 1

Citation

Wei Cheng, Olivier Rioul, Yi Liu, Julien Béguinot, Sylvain Guilley. Side-channel information leakage of code-based masked implementations. 17th Canadian Workshop on Information Theory (CWIT 2022), Jun 2022, Ottawa, Canada. ⟨hal-03718708⟩

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