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Attacking masked cryptographic implementations: Information-theoretic bounds

Wei Cheng 1, 2, 3 Yi Liu 1, 2, 3 Sylvain Guilley 4, 2, 3, 5 Olivier Rioul 1, 2, 3 
1 COMNUM - Communications Numériques
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
4 SSH - Secure and Safe Hardware
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
Abstract : Measuring the information leakage is critical for evaluating the practical security of cryptographic devices against side-channel analysis. Information-theoretic measures can be used (along with Fano’s inequality) to derive upper bounds on the success rate of any possible attack in terms of the number of side-channel measurements. Equivalently, this gives lower bounds on the number of queries for a given success probability of attack. In this paper, we consider cryptographic implementations protected by (first-order) masking schemes, and derive several information-theoretic bounds on the efficiency of any (second- order) attack. The obtained bounds are generic in that they do not depend on a specific attack but only on the leakage and masking models, through the mutual information between side- channel measurements and the secret key. Numerical evaluations confirm that our bounds reflect the practical performance of optimal maximum likelihood attacks.
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Contributor : Olivier Rioul Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, August 12, 2022 - 12:17:30 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, August 17, 2022 - 10:01:38 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-03718713, version 1


Wei Cheng, Yi Liu, Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Rioul. Attacking masked cryptographic implementations: Information-theoretic bounds. 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2022), Jun 2022, Espoo, Finland. ⟨hal-03718713⟩



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